'Tis the Season for Legal Settlements: GlaxoSmithKline, Eli Lilly, Orthofix, Sanofi all Settle

Reports of legal settlements by big health care organizations tend to dribble out towards the end of the year, maybe in a rush to finalize the year's accounting, maybe because the news will not register as well at times when people are distracted by holidays.  Here is a round-up in alphabetical order of some recent settlements of interest made by drug and device companies.

GlaxoSmithKline

Earlier this year GSK made the largest settlement, in monetary terms, ever by a pharmaceutical company (see this post).  At the end of the year it made two more.  Neither got much media attention.  The first was related to the earlier $3 billion settlement.  As reported by the [Great] Lebanon [Oregon] Express:

Oregon Attorney General Ellen Rosenblum announced in a press release that pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline has agreed to pay $90 million to Oregon and 37 other states to settle claims that it unlawfully promoted its diabetes drug, Avandia.

As the co-leader of the lawsuit, Oregon will receive $3.9 million of the settlement, according to the release.

The 38 attorneys general claimed in lawsuits filed Nov. 15 that GlaxoSmithKline misrepresented the cardiovascular risks posed by Avandia. A negotiated consent judgment was filed shortly thereafter.

 Avandia was a blockbuster drug for GlaxoSmithKline. First approved by the Food and Drug Administration in 1999, annual sales peaked at more than $2.5 billion in 2006.

Furthermore,

 Oregon and the 37 other states claim GlaxoSmithKline made safety claims about Avandia not supported by the scientific evidence.

The states allege the company failed to disclose negative information about Avendia’s cardiovascular health effects.

In addition to the monetary settlement, the agreement included all sorts of pledges by GSK:

As part of the consent judgment between the parties, GlaxoSmithKline agreed to reform how it markets and promotes diabetes drugs. It agreed to several conditions:
 • To refrain from making false, misleading, or deceptive claims about any diabetes drug;
• To refrain from making comparative safety claims not supported by substantial evidence or substantial clinical experience;
• To refrain from presenting favorable information previously thought of as valid but rendered invalid by contrary and more credible recent information;
•   To refrain from misusing statistics or otherwise misrepresenting the nature, applicability, or significance of clinical trials.

The Consent Judgment also has the following terms that are effective for at least eight years:
• GlaxoSmithKline must post summaries of all company sponsored observational studies or meta-analyses conducted by the company that are designed to inform the effective, safe, and/or appropriate use of its diabetes drugs;
• The company post summaries of company-sponsored clinical trials of diabetes products within eight months of the primary completion date;
• GlaxoSmithKline must register and post all company-sponsored clinical trials as required by federal law.

Even more under the radar was a second, unrelated settlement, only briefly chronicled by Reuters (here via the Chicago Tribune):

 British drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline Plc has reached a $150 million preliminary settlement with U.S. drug wholesalers who claimed the company improperly delayed entry to the market of generic alternatives to its nasal spray Flonase, according to court documents.

The settlement was reached with, among others, AmerisourceBergen Corp, Cardinal Health Inc, and McKesson Corp, who maintained that Glaxo had abused the citizen's petition process to maintain a market monopoly and overcharge for the spray by restricting access to less expensive generic versions.

Note that while the first settlement was clearly about misleading, deceptive marketing of a relatively dangerous drug as safe, a practice that likely lead to suffering and death of some patients, the second settlement which involved an unfair business practice that likely increased the cost of care to some patients, and decreased the profits of some competitors, lead to a monetarily larger settlement.

Again, these latter two settlements seem to just ice the cake of the $3 billion settlement earlier this year.

 Eli Lilly

Eli Lilly pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charges and settled allegations about questionable marketing practices for its anti-psychotic drug Zyprexa for over $1 billion in 2009 (see post here).  The settlement provided some instructive information about how big pharmaceutical companies employ ghost writing to sell product (see this post).  Now at the end of 2012, Eli Lilly has settled charges that it bribed government officials in countries outside of the US.  The most colorful version of this story appeared in the Wall Street Journal.  In summary,

 Eli Lilly & Co. agreed to pay $29.4 million in a settlement of U.S. government allegations that the drug maker's units made improper payments to foreign government officials to win business.

Indianapolis-based Lilly didn't admit or deny the allegations, but agreed to have an outside consultant review the company's internal controls and its measures to comply with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA. 

The colorful details were:

The SEC said in a civil complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that employees of Lilly's China unit falsified expense reports to provide spa treatments, jewelry and other gifts and cash payments to government-employed doctors between 2006 and 2009.

The SEC also alleged: Lilly hired a drug distributor in 2007 that paid bribes to health officials in a Brazilian state to facilitate about $1.2 million in sales of a Lilly drug to the state; Lilly's Polish unit paid $39,000 between 2000 and 2003 to a charitable foundation run by the head of a regional government health authority and dedicated to restoring a castle in Chudow, Poland; and that its Russian unit paid millions of dollars between 1994 and 2005 to offshore entities that the SEC said 'appear to have been used to funnel money to government officials' to obtain business for the Lilly unit.

The SEC said Lilly didn't curtail the activities of its Russian unit for several years, even after an internal Lilly review raised questions about its use of these offshore arrangements.

As in the previous set of settlements, no individual was charged or had to pay any penalty for authorizing, directing, or implementing any unethical actions.  Note that the alleged bribery went on in multiple different countries, suggesting a systemic problem with the operations of the company.  Note also that the allegations involved bribing doctors as well as bureaucrats.

Orthofix

We discussed three settlements made by medical device company Orthofix only a month ago.  These involved various vivid details including bribes to physicians disguised as consulting and royalty agreements, bribes of foreign government officials disguised as chocolate, and a device sales representative turned stripper.  As best as I can tell, Orthofix just made yet another settlement, maybe not quite so picaresque.  As per Bloomberg,

Orthofix International NV won court approval of a settlement of federal regulators’ claims that the maker of bone-repair products defrauded Medicare through a kickback scheme involving doctors, prosecutors said.

U.S. District Judge William G. Young in Boston yesterday accepted an Orthofix unit’s offer to plead guilty to a felony count of obstructing an audit and pay a $7.6 million criminal fine....

This settlement like some of the previous ones involved allegations of payments to doctors to induce them to use Orthofix devices.

As part of the agreement, Orthofix also will pay $32.3 million plus interest to resolve civil claims first raised in a whistle-blower’s lawsuit that the company defrauded the federal Medicare program through payments to doctors who used its bone-growth stimulators....

This series of cases is unusual because they resulted in a guilty plea to a felony (but by a subsidiary of the company, not the company itself), and in guilty pleas by some company employees (but not apparently any penalties to top management).

Five Orthofix employees have pleaded guilty in connection with the probe, the U.S. Justice Department said. Thomas Guerrieri, a company vice president, pleaded guilty to violating the federal anti-kickback statute by setting up fake consulting agreements for doctors who used the company’s products. 

Sanofi

French multinational pharmaceutical corporation Sanofi-Aventis settled charges of overcharging the US Medicaid system in 2009 for over $90 million  (see post here),  and of overcharging the US Medicare system in 2007 for over $190 million (see post here).  Now it just settled charges that it gave kickbacks to doctors to induce them to prescribe its product.  Per Bloomberg,

 Sanofi,  France’s biggest drugmaker, reached a settlement to pay $109 million over allegations that its U.S. units gave doctors free doses of a medicine to win their business and subvert Medicare’s drug reimbursement system.

Sanofi sales representatives entered into 'illegal sampling arrangements' with physicians, giving them the arthritis drug Hyalgan as kickbacks and 'promising to provide negotiated' amounts of the medication to lower its effective price in violation of the False Claims Act, the U.S. Justice Department said yesterday in a statement.

'Kickback schemes subvert the health-care marketplace and undermine the integrity of public health-care programs,” Stuart Delery,  who heads the department’s civil division, said in the statement. 'We will continue to hold accountable those who we allege are providing illegal incentives to influence the decision-making of health-care providers in federal health-care programs.'

Again, no individual suffered any negative consequences for authorizing, directing or implementing the bad behavior in this case.

Summary

So here we go again, four more settlements by large, rich, well known pharmaceutical and device companies.  Most of the companies involved now have a history of recent settlements for a variety of ethical misadventures.  Most of the new settlements involved allegations of deceiving and bribing physicians.

As we have noted endlessly before, legal settlements like this are useful to provide documentation of how unethical the practices, particularly marketing practices of large health care organizations have become.  However, the increasing number of repeat settlers suggest that the settlements are not deterring bad behavior.  Since the fines involved are usually small compared to the revenues that can be generated by deceptive and unethical marketing of expensive drugs, and the fines are paid out of company coffers, and are thus spread out in their impact over employees and stockholders alike, they usually have no more impact than a lash with a wet noodle, maybe at best a slap on the wrist.  Since the people involved in authorizing, directing and implementing the bad behavior can likely greatly improve their "numbers" and hence generate big salaries and bonuses, but face a minimal risk of any individual negative consequences, they are likely to continue unethical practices.

Given that so many of these cases involve deception and/or bribery of health care professionals, I still hope that some will get upset at the effect on their professional values to take action.

Meanwhile, I repeat until blue in the face....   we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

Denying the Inconvenient Truth About Study 329

On 1BoringOldMan, Mickey, the semi-anonymous retired psychiatrist blogger, has updated the saga of Study 329.  The manipulation of Study 329 was a central part of the US government's case against GlaxoSmithKline that was recently settled for $3 billion and resulted in three guilty pleas by the company (look here and here.)

Mickey's previous voluminous series of posts on this subject are listed here.  He and others, most notably Dr Jon Jureidini, have attempted to get the journal that published the now widely ridiculed Study 329 retracted.  His three recent posts on the subject are:
the lesson of Study 329: an unfinished symphony…
 hide-and-go-seek… 
 a response… 

 In the most recent of these, he argued,

In this particular case, there are no facts in question. It was a negative trial, declared negative by the people who did it. The paper was ghost-written and reviewed by the sponsor before any of the twenty two authors ever saw a manuscript. The science was jury-rigged to imply a positive outcome where none was supported using well-documented sleight of hand. None of that is speculative. And the article has been a centerpiece for court settlements worth billions of dollars.

Yet, the  Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry refused to retract the article. Mickey's opinion in the second of the posts listed above,

One can only conclude that they found this article to be an inconvenient truth, and that Dr. Andres Martin and his colleagues in the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry believe that acknowledging that truth would do more harm than good [or maybe even found a way not to see the truth at all, though it's hard to imagine how]. Sooner or later, this whole tawdry saga is going to find its way out of the blogs and courtrooms and into the full light of day. And the question that’s going to be asked is why didn’t Medicine itself deal with the problem? Why didn’t the Journal itself retract the misinformation once they knew about it? Why didn’t the industry sponsor itself call for the retraction as part of their settlement with the DOJ? What possible reasonable reason could there be for leaving a paper that is a lie in their journal without even an expression of concern, much less a retraction? And there aren’t going to be any believable answers.

Mickey concluded the most recent post,

The loser in this story is the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and ultimately psychiatry itself…

The longer inconvenient truths are ignored or suppressed, the more inconvenient, and hazardous they will ultimately become. 

ADDENDUM (26 December, 2012) - One more post on 1BoringOldMan: telling the truth as a liability…

Its conclusion

By any criteria, the conclusion to the 2001 Keller et al article is wrong ["Paroxetine is generally well tolerated and effective for major depression in adolescents"]. That’s not the reason that some of us have been so persistent in pushing for retraction. The reason is that it was wrong at the time the article was published, and they knew it was wrong, but published it anyway. We want to make a statement about the integrity of the scientific literature.

ONC's Christmas Confessional on Health IT Safety: "HIT Patient Safety Action & Surveillance Plan for Public Comment"

This time of year is certainly appropriate for a confessional on the health IT industry and hyperenthusiasts' sins.

In the first report I've seen that seems genuinely imbued with a  basic level of recognition of social responsibility incurred by conducting the grand human subjects experiment known as national health IT, ONC has issued a Dec. 21, 2012 report "Health Information Technology Patient Safety Action & Surveillance Plan for Public Comment." It is available at this link in PDF.

Statements are made that have appeared repeatedly since 2004 at this blog, and my health IT difficulties site that went online years before this blog (1998 to be exact); it is possible through my early writing and that of like-minded colleagues that we were the origin of most of these memes.  We wrote them with the result of bringing much scorn upon ourselves. After all, "how could health IT possibly not be a panacea?" was the "you are an apostate" attitude I certainly experienced (e.g., as in my Sept. 2012 post "The Dangers of Critical Thinking in A Politicized, Irrational Culture").

Observations echoed in the new ONC report:

• "Just as health IT can create new opportunities to improve patient care and safety, it can also create new potentials for harm."
• Health IT will only fulfill its enormous potential to improve patient safety if the risks associated with its use are identified, if there is a coordinated effort to mitigate those risks, and if it is used to make care safer.
• Because health IT is so tightly integrated into care delivery today, it is difficult to interpret this initial research [such as the PA Patient Safety Authority study  - ed.], which would seem to suggest that health IT is a modest cause of medical errors. However, it is difficult to say whether a medical error is health IT-related. [Not emphasized, as I wrote here, is the issue of risk when, say, tens of thousands of prescriptions are erroneous due to one software bug, a feat impossible with paper - ed.]
• The proper steps to improve the safety of health IT can only be taken if there is better information regarding health IT’s risks, harms, and impact on patient safety.

Suggested steps to be taken include:

• Make it easier for clinicians to report patient safety events and risks using EHR technology.
• Engage health IT developers to embrace their shared responsibility for patient safety and promote reporting of patient safety events and risks. [I am frankly amazed to see this admission.  In the past, that sector excused itself entirely on the basis of the "learned intermediary" doctrine and "hold harmless" clauses; where the clinician is an all-knowing Deity between computer and patient.  I've been writing for years, however, that the computer is now the intermediary between clinician and patient since all care 'transactions' have to traverse what is now an enterprise clinical resource and clinician control system - ed.]
• Provide support to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs) to identify, aggregate, and analyze health IT safety event and hazard reports.
• Incorporate health IT safety in post-market surveillance of certified EHR technology
• Align CMS health and safety standards with the safety of health IT, and train surveyors.
• Collect data on health IT safety events through the Quality & Safety Review System (QSRS).
• Monitor health IT adverse event reports to the Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database. [I've been promoting the use of MAUDE for just that purpose, and much more regarding documenting and reporting on mission-hostile health IT; see this post - ed.]

These steps are to be taken in order to "Inspire Confidence and Trust in Health IT and Health Information Exchange."

The title of my keynote address to the Health Informatics Society of Australia this summer was, in fact, "Critical Thinking on Building Trusted, Transformative Medical Information:  Improving Health IT as the First Step".

My thoughts on this report:

• It is at least two decades overdue.
• It was produced largely if not solely due to the pressure of the "HIT apostates", finally overcoming industry memes and control of information flows through great perseverance.
• It is indeed a confessional of the sins committed by the health IT industry over those decades.  Creating, implementing and maintaining mission critical software in a safety-cognizant way is not, and was not, a mystery.  It's been done in numerous industries for decades.
• It is still a bit weak in acknowledging the likely magnitude of under-reporting of medical errors, including HIT-related, in the available data, and the issue of risk vs. 'confirmed body counts' as I wrote at my recent post "A Significant Additional Observation on the PA Patient Safety Authority Report -- Risk".
• It is unfortunate that this report did not come from the informatics academic community in the United States, i.e., the American Medical Informatics Association (AMIA).  AMIA's academics have done well in advancing the theoretical aspects of the technologies, and how to create "good health IT" and not "bad health IT."  However, they have largely abrogated their social responsibilities and obligations, including but not limited to those of physicians, in ensuring the theories were followed in practice by an industry all too eager to ignore academic research (which, in order to follow, utilizes money and resources and reduces margins).

(On the latter point, just last week did the American College of Medical Informatics [ACMI] refuse to permit me to be a speaker at their early 2013 annual retreat despite support from some of its members.)

And this:

• If the industry and the academics had been doing their job responsibly, I might be spending this Christmas and New Years's holiday with my mother, rather than visiting her in the cemetery.

All that said, the report is welcome.

Finally, it is hoped - and expected - that public comments will indeed be "public", and that any irregularities in such comments (such as appeared in the public comments period for MU2 due to industry ghostwriting as in my Aug. 2012 post "Health IT Vendor EPIC Caught Red-Handed: Ghostwriting And Using Customers as Stealth Lobbyists - Did ONC Ignore This?" and Sept. 2012 post "Was EPIC successful in watering down the Meaningful Use Stage 2 Final Rule?") will be reported and acted upon in an aggressive manner.

And finally, from the Healthcare Renewal blog, Merry Christmas.

-- SS

Amgen Settles, Pleads Guilty to Misbranding Aranesp

Now it's Amgen's turn to settle and plead.  Per the New York Times,

The biotechnology giant Amgen marketed its anemia drug Aranesp for unapproved uses even after the Food and Drug Administration explicitly ruled them out, federal prosecutors said on Tuesday.

 The federal charges were made public as Amgen pleaded guilty to illegally marketing the drug and agreed to pay $762 million in criminal penalties and settlements of whistle-blower lawsuits.

Amgen was 'pursuing profits at the risk of patient safety' Marshall L. Miller, acting United States attorney in Brooklyn, said in a telephone news briefing on Tuesday.

David J. Scott, Amgen’s general counsel, entered the guilty plea at the United States District Court in Brooklyn to a single misdemeanor count of misbranding the drug, Aranesp, meaning selling it for uses not approved by the F.D.A.

Amgen agreed to pay $136 million in criminal fines and forfeit $14 million, with about $612 million going to settle civil litigation. 

The article noted the key charge against Amgen,

 In court on Tuesday, prosecutors charged that Amgen had promoted the use of Aranesp to treat anemia in cancer patients who were not undergoing chemotherapy, even though the drug’s approval was only for patients receiving chemotherapy.

A subsequent study sponsored by Amgen showed that use of Aranesp by those nonchemotherapy cancer patients had actually increased the risk of death, and the off-label use diminished. 

Also,

 The federal charges also say Amgen promoted using larger but less frequent injection of Aranesp than stated in the label as a way of making the drug more attractive to doctors and patients than Procrit, a rival anemia drug from Johnson & Johnson. 

As is typical of such cases, the prosecutors could not figure out how to charge any individuals who might have authorized, directed, or implemented the bad behavior,

 Mr. Miller said that the evidence in the Amgen case was not sufficient to charge individuals. However, he said, Amgen agreed to sign a corporate integrity agreement that requires executives and board members to personally certify compliance with regulations. That would make it easier to prosecute individuals should violations occur again, he said. 

The Charges in Context

In some reports of the settlement, the issue appeared to be money.  For example, Pharmalot reported that after a whistle-blower filed suit against Amgen, "a subsequent investigation by the Justice Department found that these practices induced physicians to use Amgen medications unnecessarily when lower cost alternatives were available."

However, Amgen's practices could have had much worse effects than just removing money from the US Treasury.

Consider the context.  Only a few of the not very numerous articles in the media on this case noted that the key complaint was that Amgen was pushing use of Aranesp for patients with cancer, specifically those not receiving chemotherapy.   (Reuters made this explicit, for example, but not so the Los Angeles Times, or Bloomberg's initial coverage.)

 In fact, there has been concern about the adverse effects of Aranesp for patients with cancer for a while.  In 2007, Khuri noted in a commentary in the New England Journal of Medicine(1) that "concern about a detrimental effect of ESAs [erythropoiesis stimulating agents, a class of drugs of which Aranesp is a prominent member] in patients with cancer arose" after results of a small clinical trial of epoetin beta in patients with oral, pharyngeal or laryngeal cancer receiving radiation therapy showed worse survival in patients receiving that drug.  Subsequently, in 2008, a meta-analysis of multiple randomized clinical trials showed that patients with cancer receiving ESAs, including Aranesp, had an increased risk of venous thromboembolism (drug clots) and death.(2)  In 2009,  another meta-analysis showed that ESAs lead to decreased survival in patients with cancer.(3)

Recall, though, that Aranesp is meant to improve anemia.  It was not meant to cure cancer, or even put the disease into remission.  Its use therefore was mainly adjunctive.  Thus, it appears its benefits for cancer patients (improved anemia, and possibly decrease in such symptoms as fatigue) could not outweigh its harms (including hastening death).

So the issue was not merely that Amgen was promoting a drug in an instance in which its use had not been improved by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), or that such use of the drug was unnecessarily costly.  The issue was that Amgen was promoting a drug that had no proven benefits for the patients, but could hasten their death.  It appears that Amgen was pursuing profits at the expense of lives.

Summary

So it is particularly disturbing that no individual apparently will be held responsible for the promotion of Aranesp for patients for whom its use might prove fatal.  The assurance that the proposed corporate integrity agreement will prevent further abuse is notably hollow.  I can recall no recent case in which the government authorities have used such an agreement to pursue charges against individuals.  The likely deterrent effect of the monetary settlement will likely be minimal.  $762 million may look just like a cost of doing business when the drug in question was bringing in over $2 billion a year (per the Los Angeles Times). 

So the legal settlements march on and on.  The government continues to extract fines from health care organizations whose actions endanger not only the federal budget, but patients' well being and lives, without even trying to hold individuals responsible.  The impunity of health care corporate executives thus also continues.

As we have said far too many times, we will not deter unethical behavior by health care organizations until the people who authorize, direct or implement bad behavior fear some meaningfully negative consequences. Real health care reform needs to make health care leaders accountable, and especially accountable for the bad behavior that helped make them rich.

References

1.  Khuri FR. Weighing the hazards of erythropoiesis stimulation in patients with cancer.  N Engl J Med 2007; 356: 2445-2447.  Link here.

2.  Bennett CI, Silver SM, Djulbegovic B et al.  Venous thromboembolism and mortality associated with recombinant erythropoietin and darbepoetin administration for the treatment of cancer-associated anemia.  JAMA 2008; 299: 914-924.  Link here.

3.  Bohlius J, Schmidlin K, Brillant C et al.  Recombinant human eryhtropoiesis-stimulating agents and mortality in patients with cancer: a meta-analysis of randomised trials.  Lancet 2009; 373: 1532-1542.  Link here.

A Significant Additional Observation on the PA Patient Safety Authority Report "The Role of the Electronic Health Record in Patient Safety Events" -- Risk

At a Dec. 13, 2012 post "Pennsylvania Patient Safety Authority: The Role of the Electronic Health Record in Patient Safety Events" I alluded to risk in a comment in red italics:

... Reported events were categorized by their reporter-selected harm score (see Table 1). Of the 3,099 EHR-related events, 2,763 (89%) were reported as “event, no harm” (e.g., an error did occur but there was no adverse outcome for the patient) [a risk best avoided to start with, because luck runs out eventually - ed.], and 320 (10%) were reported as “unsafe conditions,” which did not result in a harmful event. 

The focus of the report is on how the "events" did not cause harm.  Thus the relatively mild caveat:

"Although the vast majority of EHR-related reports did not document actual harm to the patient, analysts believe that further study of EHR-related near misses and close calls is warranted as a proactive measure."

It occurs that if the title of the paper had been "The Role of the Electronic Health Record in Patient Safety Risk", the results might have been interpreted far differently:

In essence, from from June 2, 2004, through May 18, 2012 (the timeframe of the Pennsylvania Patient Safety Reporting System or PA-PSRS database), from a dataset highly limited in its comprehensiveness as written in the earlier post, there were approximately 3,000 "events" where an error did occur that potentially put patients at risk.

That view - risk - was not the focus of the study.  Should it have been?

These "events" really should be called "risk events."

It is likely the tally of risk events, if the database were more comprehensive (due to better recognition of HIT-related problems, better reporting, etc.) would be much higher.  So would the reports of "harm and death" events as well.

That patient harm did not occur from the majority of "risk events" was through human intervention, which is to say, luck, in large part

Luck runs out, eventually.

I have personally saved a relative several times from computer-related "risk events" that could have caused harm if I were not there personally, and with my own medical knowledge, to have intervened.  My presence was happenstance in several instances; in fact a traffic jam or phone call could have caused me to have not been present.

What's worse, the report notes:

Analysts noted that EHR-related reports are increasing over time, which was to be expected as adoption of EHRs is growing in the United States overall.

In other words, with the current national frenzy to implement healthcare information technology, these "risk events" - and "harm and death events" - counts will increase.  My concern is that they will increase significantly.

I note that health IT is likely the only mission-critical technology that receives special accommodation regarding risk events.  "If the events didn't cause harm, then they're not that important an issue" seems to be the national attitude overall.

Imagine aircraft whose avionics and controls periodically malfunction, freeze, provide wrong results, etc., but most are caught by hyper-vigilant pilots so planes don't go careening out of control and crash.  Imagine nuclear plants where the same occurs, but due to hypervigilance the operators prevent a nuclear meltdown.

Then, imagine reports of these "risk events" - based on fragmentary reporting of pilots and nuclear plant operators reluctant to do so for fear of job retaliation - where the fact of their occurrence takes a back seat to the issue that the planes did not crash, or Three Mile Island or Chernobyl did not reoccur.

That, in fact, seems to be the culture of health IT.

I submit that the major focus that needs addressing in health IT is risk - not just confirmed body counts.

-- SS